



# Emergency Movement Control

**Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency  
Management Groups, and agencies with responsibilities  
for movement control in an emergency [DGL 18/15]**



**Resilient New Zealand  
Aotearoa Manahau**

**New Zealand Government**

## **Emergency Movement Control**

Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, and agencies with responsibilities for movement control in an emergency [DGL 18/15]

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### **Authority**

This guideline has been issued by the Director of the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management pursuant to s9(3) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002. It provides assistance to CDEM Groups and other agencies in the planning for an implementation of movement control in an emergency.

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### **Cover images**

Cordon in Wellington following 2013 Seddon earthquake (MCDEM); damage to the Mangamahu Bridge following 2006 lower North Island floods; movement control equipment.



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## Foreword

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The Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake<sup>1</sup> recommended that guidelines be established for the setting up, management, contraction and demobilising of cordons in an emergency.

The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission<sup>2</sup> also listed four recommendations under “Cordon Management”, they are:

- Rec 111. Civil defence and emergency management should be responsible for setting up and maintaining cordons during the state of emergency.*
- Rec 112. Territorial authorities should be responsible for maintaining any cordons that are in place at the end of the state of emergency until the public space or building they surround is made safe.*
- Rec 113. Territorial authorities should be able to recover the costs of maintaining any necessary cordons from the building owner after three months.*
- Rec 114. The roles and responsibilities of decision makers should be described in the building safety evaluation process. The roles and responsibilities should allow for flexibility of operation according to the circumstances and scale of the event.*



The recommendations from the Independent Review of the Response to the Christchurch earthquake together with those made by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission have been accepted by Government. This guidance addresses the recommendations related to emergency movement control (cordon management). It is aimed at orientating Controllers and personnel about the considerations related to movement control to enable them to direct the management of access along public thoroughfares (roads, walkways) and to and from property.

**Sarah Stuart-Black**

Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management

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<sup>1</sup> Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/review-of-the-civil-defence-emergency-management-response-to-the-22-february-christchurch-earthquake/>

<sup>2</sup> Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 2012: Final Report - <http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/Commission-Reports>

# Contents

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<b>Section 1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1 About this guideline .....	1
1.2 Key terms .....	2
<b>Section 2 About movement control</b> .....	<b>5</b>
2.1 Overview .....	5
2.1.1 Principles .....	5
2.1.2 Statutory authority.....	6
2.2 Movement control measures .....	6
2.2.1 Cordons .....	7
2.2.2 Road blocks .....	8
2.2.3 Barricades.....	8
2.2.4 Checkpoint.....	9
2.2.5 Contraflow traffic.....	9
2.3 Advantages and disadvantages .....	10
2.4 Movement control and CIMS.....	11
2.5 New Zealand Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management .....	11
<b>Section 3 Readiness</b> .....	<b>13</b>
3.1 Developing arrangements in response plans .....	13
3.2 Identifying and preparing resources .....	14
3.2.1 Barricades and signage .....	14
3.2.2 Identifying personnel.....	15
3.3 Training and exercising .....	15
<b>Section 4 Response</b> .....	<b>16</b>
4.1 States of emergency .....	16
4.1.1 If a state of emergency is not in force .....	16
4.1.2 In a declared state of emergency .....	17
4.2 Gathering information.....	18
4.3 Analysing the information .....	19
4.4 Coordination and liaison.....	20
4.4.1 Transport Operations Centres .....	20
4.4.2 Emergency services .....	21
4.4.3 Lifeline utilities .....	21
4.5 Evacuation.....	22
4.6 Ongoing considerations.....	22
4.6.1 Public information .....	23
4.6.2 Hazard identification and notification inside controlled areas .....	24
4.6.3 Main supply routes.....	24
4.6.4 Health, safety, and security .....	24
4.6.5 Other key considerations .....	26
Accessing critical private information .....	26
Putrescible waste .....	26

Animals.....	26
Vehicles and property.....	27
4.7 Retrieval of costs .....	27
<b>Section 5 Recovery .....</b>	<b>28</b>
5.1 Transition plans .....	28
5.2 Cordon reduction .....	28
5.2.1 Reintroduction of people to evacuated areas.....	30
5.3 Return to business as usual .....	30
<b>Section 6 Appendices .....</b>	<b>31</b>
Appendix A About CDEM .....	32
Appendix B Cordon management - example.....	37
Appendix C Response checklist .....	39
Appendix D References.....	42



# Section 1 Introduction

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This section provides an introduction to this guideline and includes definitions for some of the key terms and abbreviations used.

## 1.1 About this guideline

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The **purpose** of this guideline is to describe the major considerations and best practice approaches for the preparation and execution of emergency movement control. This guideline is focused primarily on large scale emergencies; however, many of the concepts and processes translate to smaller scale events.

The **intended audience** of this guideline is emergency management personnel within Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, and other agencies (including emergency services) that have responsibilities in preparing for or implementing movement control measures.

### Structure

This guideline has the following main sections:

- Section 1 [Introduction](#) – an introduction to this guideline.
- Section 2 [About movement control](#) – a description of movement control in the CDEM context, as well some of the key underlying principles and concepts.
- Section 3 [Readiness](#) – how agencies can prepare for the implementation of emergency movement control.
- Section 4 [Response](#) – the phases of response in relation to movement control, and a description of the key ongoing considerations.
- Section 5 [Recovery](#) – considerations during recovery and transition from an emergency response.
- Section 6 [Appendices](#) – reference information and other useful resources.

### Use of icons

The following icons are used in this guideline:



Indicates a template is provided in the appendices



Indicates more information is available in another document or website

Relevant legislation and guidance



This guideline is subordinate to the *National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 (National CDEM Plan 2015)* and the *CIMS Manual (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)*.

This guidance complements other guidelines issued by the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM), particularly:

- *Response Management, Directors Guideline for CDEM Group and Local Controllers [DGL06/08]*
- *Mass Evacuation Planning - Director's Guidelines for Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups [DGL 07/08]*.

These guidelines are available at [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).

## 1.2 Key terms

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The following key terms, abbreviations, and acronyms are used in this guideline.

More general CDEM-related terms are defined in Appendix A [About CDEM](#)

### TTM

Movement control is usually associated with **Temporary Traffic Management (TTM)** for roadways and walkways.

Roading Controlling Authorities (and Transport Operations Centres (TOCs) in certain large cities) use TTM routinely for road works and large events.

### Code of practice for temporary traffic management (CoPTTM)

TTM is addressed by the NZ Transport Authority **Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management (CoPTTM)**, which is the principal traffic management reference in New Zealand.

From May 2013, the 4th edition of the Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management was ratified as the reference document guiding temporary traffic management on both state highway and local road networks.

### Road Controlling Authority (RCA)

A **Road Controlling Authority (RCA)** is defined in the *Land Transport Management Act 2003*.

### 5 Interpretation...

- (a) in relation to a road, means the Minister, department of State, Crown entity, State enterprise, or territorial authority that controls the road; but
- (b) in relation to a road within Auckland that is controlled by Auckland Transport, means Auckland Transport.



## Business as usual

**Business as usual (BAU)** refers to structures, practices, and procedures that apply when there is no emergency response; i.e. during normal conditions.

## CIMS

The **Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)** is the primary reference for incident management in New Zealand. The purpose of CIMS is to achieve effective coordinated incident management across responding agencies for all incidents regardless of hazard, size, and complexity.

There are seven CIMS functions:

- **Control** is responsible for the overall direction and management of an emergency or an element of it.
- **Intelligence** is responsible for the collection and analysis of response information, especially relating to the status, hazards and context of the emergency.
- **Planning** is responsible for developing and updating Action Plans, and other plans such as long-term or contingency plans.
- **Operations** is responsible for the day-to-day coordination of the response, detailed task planning, and the implementation of the Action Plan. It is also responsible for volunteer coordination, lifeline utility coordination, and liaising with other agencies.
- **Logistics** is responsible for providing and tracking resources to support the response and the affected communities, and providing logistics advice to other CIMS functions.
- **Public Information Management (PIM)** is responsible for informing the public about the incident and the response (including actions they need to take), media liaison and monitoring, and community liaison. On the Controller's direction PIM also issue warnings and advisories.
- **Welfare** is responsible for coordinating and delivering emergency welfare services and resources to affected individuals, families/whānau, and communities.



More information about CIMS is provided in the *Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)* manual 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, available on the publications page of the MCDEM website [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).

## Coordination centre

A **coordination centre (CC)** is the location from which a Controller and Incident Management Team (IMT) manages a response. There are four types of coordination centre:

- Incident Control Points (ICPs) operate at an incident level
- Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) operate at a local level
- Emergency Coordination Centres (ECCs) operate at a CDEM Group level, and
- National Coordination Centres (NCCs) operate at the national level.

**Director's  
Guidelines**

**Director's Guidelines** are documents developed by MCDEM, to provide guidance to CDEM Groups and other agencies regarding CDEM. They are issued by the Director of CDEM under the *CDEM Act 2002*.

**Lifeline utilities**

**Lifeline utilities** are the entities that provide essential infrastructure services to the community, such as water, wastewater, transport, energy, and telecommunications.

The lifeline utilities named or described in the *CDEM Act 2002* have responsibilities related to emergencies under the Act.

**State of  
emergency**

**State of emergency** has the same meaning as in the *Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002* (CDEM Act).

**4 Interpretation...**

State of local emergency means a state of local emergency declared under section 68 or section 69 of the CDEM Act.

State of national emergency means a state of national emergency declared under section 66 of the CDEM Act.

**Territorial  
authority (TA)**

A **territorial authority (TA)** is a city or district council or unitary authority that administers local roads and reserves, sewage, building consents, the land use and subdivision aspects of resource management, and environmental, public transport and other local matters.

## Section 2 About movement control

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This section describes movement control in the CDEM context, as well as some of the key underlying principles and concepts.

### 2.1 Overview

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Movement control is the process of managing access to public thoroughfares (roads and walkways), and to and from property.

It is often associated with TTM, which involves setting up road blocks, detours, and checkpoints. The other key element of movement control in the CDEM context is establishing and managing cordons. See section 2.2 [Movement control measures](#).

Implementing emergency movement control reduces risk to the public and response personnel, and minimises interruptions to response operations.

#### 2.1.1 Principles

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A number of fundamental principles apply to effective movement control, regardless of the scale of the emergency.

- **Necessity** – the need for movement control must be carefully considered before any measures are implemented; advantages and disadvantages should be weighed against the necessity.
- **Aims and goals** – movement control should always be aim or goal-orientated; for example, a key aim of the Controller should always be to avoid unnecessary extended movement control.
- **Continuity of public activity** – movement control should try not to impede normal public activity as much as practical, helping to ensure a swift, effective response and recovery.
- **Rapid setup** – movement control measures are most effective when established rapidly.
- **Experienced personnel** – emergency movement control is best when managed and executed by experienced emergency management personnel, with assistance from traffic managers and other associated personnel.
- **Communication with stakeholders and the public** – people need to be well informed about the nature and duration of movement control measures.
- **Business as usual (BAU) processes** – movement control in an emergency should be based on BAU systems, augmented with additional resources and capability to cover escalating demands, and any unexpected circumstances.

- **Coordination between responding agencies** – cross-agency coordination is essential to ensure that access to and from restricted areas is enabled, particularly in regards to statutory functions and powers in declared and non-declared emergencies. Working within Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) structures will help ensure this.

## 2.1.2 Statutory authority

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When a state of emergency is in force, a Controller may authorise the exclusion of people from any place under Section 86 of the *CDEM Act 2002*.

Other agencies also have the statutory authority to restrict or control movement, as shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1 Agencies with statutory authority for movement control**

Agency with authority to restrict movement	Legislation
Local authorities	<i>Local Government Act 1974</i>
Police	<i>Policing Act 2008 – s35</i>
Fire Service	<i>Fire Service Act 1975</i> <i>Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977</i>
Biosecurity New Zealand	<i>Biosecurity Act 1993</i>
Environmental Protection Authority	<i>Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996</i>
New Zealand Transport Agency	<i>Roading Powers Act 1989</i>
Maritime New Zealand	<i>Maritime Transport Act 1994</i>

See section 4.1 [States of emergency](#) for more detail.

## 2.2 Movement control measures

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Movement control may involve putting in place the following measures:

- cordons
- road blocks
- barricades
- checkpoints, and
- contraflow traffic.

## 2.2.1 Cordons

A cordon restricts movement into and out of an area.

Cordons can be established using:

- barricades (see section 2.2.3 [Barricades](#))
- personnel (such as checkpoint personnel or security guards), and
- the area's natural features.

### Cordons in CIMS

The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) proposes two cordons: an inner cordon and an outer cordon.

An inner cordon is established directly around an incident and only personnel from the responding agencies operate in this inner cordon. All other people are evacuated.

If necessary, an outer cordon is established further from the incident and is used to control access to the area of operations and/or facilitate traffic movement around restricted areas.

Safe Forward Point(s), Staging Area(s), and other agency specific facilities are usually sited between the inner and outer cordons, as shown in Figure 1 below. More information is also provided in the *CIMS Manual 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*, available on the publications page of the MCDEM website:

[www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).




Figure 1 Inner and outer cordons (from CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Manual)

## Long-term cordons

Unless a cordon is removed quickly, the requirements for access and conditions within the cordon become more complex.

Effective cordon management acknowledges the requirements of numerous stakeholders that will need authorised access including contractors, building/land owners, tenants, lifeline utilities, and emergency services.

It is important to manage the expectations of all stakeholders. This will involve establishing a set of rules that prescribe the appropriate actions and behaviours within the cordon, including:

- hours of work
- types of work
- access conditions
- emergency/evacuation arrangements
- safety requirements including minimum Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) requirements and reporting of incidents,
- dispute resolution process, and
- policy on animals, alcohol, driving restrictions and age restrictions.

See section 5.2 [Cordon reduction](#) for a list of considerations related to ongoing cordon management and phased reduction.

See also Appendix B [Cordon management - example](#), which includes a template for developing cordon rules.



## 2.2.2 Road blocks

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A road block is any barrier or obstruction that prevents or limits the passage of people or vehicles along a road.

A road block may be established using signage, personnel, and any type of barricade (see section 2.2.3 [Barricades](#)).

### Detours

Establishing a road block may involve setting up a detour to allow traffic to bypass the affected area.

The CoPTTM provides detailed guidance on establishing road blocks and detours (see section 2.5 [New Zealand Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management](#) for more information).

## 2.2.3 Barricades

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A barricade can be formed by any object or structure that creates a barrier or obstacle, including:

- traffic cones
- sandbags

- safety fences
- concrete barriers, or
- water filled barriers.

### Improvisation

Barricades are best established using equipment designed for the purpose, such as safety fencing. However, in some emergency responses (particularly those with little or no warning), barricades may need to be improvised from other equipment, such as:

- barrier tape
- rubbish skips or wheelie bins, or
- stationary vehicles.

## 2.2.4 Checkpoint

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A checkpoint is a site used to observe and control movement, including vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

Effective and robust checkpoint procedures allow activity within the affected area to be monitored, and all people accounted for.

Traffic may be stopped at a checkpoint, but no permanent physical obstruction is placed on the roadway to prevent access. Temporary obstructions such as booms or moveable barriers may be used.

Checkpoints are also an essential feature of a cordon. They are typically used to confirm authorisation for access and record movement; they are also used to log the intended or completed actions of those moving into or out of the cordon. Checks are usually performed by personnel, although electronic surveillance equipment may also be used.

## 2.2.5 Contraflow traffic

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Contraflow is the process of reversing the flow of traffic in some traffic lanes. This measure increases the number of lanes for use to move traffic away from an area, allowing for a faster clearing time.

Contraflow is typically only considered for large-scale events (both emergencies and non-emergencies).

### Urban areas

Contraflow will generally be easier to implement in areas where there are only one or two access roads.

In urban areas with large numbers of intersecting roadways, the logistics of setting up road blocks, diversions and signage to ensure that the contraflow lanes are free of traffic before switching flow direction, is resource-intensive, personnel-dependent and time-consuming.

### Safety

Logistical support to ensure the safety of people in a contraflow scenario,

especially in adverse weather, needs to be taken into account when analysing the need for and planning contraflow.

In the early stages of an emergency it is likely that limited barricade equipment will be available. Due to the risk of confusion and head-on collisions occurring during a contraflow operation, it is important to task an experienced traffic or site supervisor to the site as soon as possible to facilitate a safe, efficient layout.

#### Access to the affected area

The setting up of contraflow traffic must not impede response agencies' access into the affected area.

## 2.3 Advantages and disadvantages

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Movement control has advantages and disadvantages that must be understood and analysed. These considerations will inform operational decisions, as well as public information messages and communication with people and businesses affected by movement control.

#### Advantages

Advantages of effective movement control include:

- keeping people away from identified or suspected safety risks
- controlling the exposure of emergency and essential services (including lifeline utility) personnel to identified or suspected safety risks
- public confidence in the management of an emergency
- accelerating the delivery of response or recovery activities such as rescue, building works and lifeline utility restoration works, and
- identifying personnel inside hazardous areas when an additional emergency occurs, for example an aftershock, landslide, rock fall, flood wave, or building or structural collapse.

#### Disadvantages

Disadvantages of movement control include:

- impeding traffic flow when freely moving traffic is desirable, for example in an evacuation
- impacts on people other than those directly under threat
- flow on effects such as additional demand for shelter and other welfare services for displaced people
- adverse economic effects resulting from customers and staff unable to access businesses inside a controlled area, and if businesses can't access stock, data, or equipment
- exposure of unattended property within controlled areas to further damage or criminal activity
- disruption of normal traffic routes leading to congestion, which may increase hazard risks to travellers. Congestion also has an economic



impact in terms of increased vehicle operating cost and travel time delays, and

- ineffective movement control will reduce confidence in the management of the emergency, particularly if the controls are out of date and seen to be needless. This can undermine compliance and effectiveness of the controls. Ineffective movement control can be particularly detrimental for emergency services and lifeline utilities.

## 2.4 Movement control and CIMS

All of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) functions have some involvement in emergency movement control, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2 Movement control and CIMS**

CIMS function	Involvement in Movement Control
Control	Responsible for approving movement control measures. May request or direct that movement control be applied.
Intelligence	Responsible for hazard analysis, collating and communicating information leading to or resulting from movement control.
Planning	Responsible for identifying the need for and incorporating movement control plans into over-all action plans, long-term plans and forecasting resourcing requirements.
Operations	Responsible for coordination of movement control activities and forecasting resource requirements.
Logistics	Responsible for the supply of resources including personnel, equipment and transportation to support movement control and affected populations.
Welfare	Responsible for supporting individuals, families/whānau, and communities who have been displaced or isolated as a result of movement control.
PIM	Responsible for issuing public information, media liaison, and community liaison. Refer to section 4.6.1 <a href="#">Public information</a> .

## 2.5 New Zealand Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management

Movement control is usually associated with TTM for roadways and walkways.

The 4th edition of the CoPTTM is New Zealand's primary reference document on temporary traffic management, on both state highway and local road networks. It is used primarily by New Zealand's Road Controlling Authorities (RCAs).

### Using the CoPTTM

The processes and principles detailed in the CoPTTM can be applied to movement control (particularly road blocks and detours) in an emergency, with necessary adjustments made according to the scale of the response and the resources available.

In a large scale emergency, traffic management resources will be scarce; using a full CoPTTM set-up may not be practicable. Improvisation may be required.

Business as usual CoPTTM practices should be adopted as soon as resources and circumstances allow.

## Development

The Road Controlling Authorities Forum (RCAF), which is a group of representatives from territorial authorities, the Department of Conservation, New Zealand Transport Agency (NZ Transport Agency), and Local Government New Zealand, has contributed to the development of the CoPTTM.



The NZ Transport Agency is responsible for the CoPTTM, which is now Part 8 of the Traffic Control Devices Manual (TCD Manual).

The TCD Manual and the CoPTTM is available at [www.nzta.govt.nz](http://www.nzta.govt.nz).

## Section 3 Readiness

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During readiness, CDEM organisations and emergency services need to:

- including arrangements for emergency movement control in response plans
- identify and prepare equipment and resources, and
- identify and prepare movement control personnel through training, qualifications, and experience.

### The benefits of preparedness

The experience and preparedness of personnel, and the preparedness of materials, equipment, and systems will improve efficiency and effectiveness. Preparedness can also minimise the disadvantages and optimise the advantages of movement control.

### 3.1 Developing arrangements in response plans

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Arrangements for emergency movement control in response plans should address:

- authority (who is authorised to approve movement control measures in different situations; see section 2.1.2 [Statutory authority](#))
- cross-agency collaboration, including clearly identified and agreed roles and responsibilities of response agencies
- identification of suitably experienced personnel capable of establishing or managing emergency movement control measures
- significant or vulnerable zones, including buildings or areas with high population densities, main arterial roads, alternative routes, and traffic congestion points
- identification of vulnerable communities, such as people with disabilities, culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities, or the young and/or elderly
- locations of and access to movement control equipment, such as signage or barricades
- operational logistics, including getting movement control personnel and equipment to potentially affected areas, and
- procedures for evacuating buildings or areas, including supporting displaced people, or those sheltering in place.

Much of this information will already be included in local authority or Road Controlling Authority Traffic Management Plans.

### Drafting public messages

Draft public information materials and notices related to emergency movement control should be prepared.

The Public Information Management (PIM) Manager and PIM team can assist with this.

### Information systems

The use of a movement control information system is critical, especially for cordon management.

Agencies will already have their own information management systems; these may have features or functionalities useful for movement control. Where use of an electronic system is not possible or practical, manual systems should be developed during readiness; for example, a paper-based check-in/check-out procedure for a cordon.

### Procedures

Agencies may develop response procedures for emergency movement control during readiness, along with supporting documentation (such as a key contact list).



Appendix C [Response checklist](#) includes a list of response actions (at a high level), and may be used to develop a response procedure for movement control.

### Local Transport Operations Centres or Support Groups

A local Transport Operations Centre or Support Group (variously called Transport Management Cells or Regional Transport Response Teams), as implemented by some CDEM Groups or local authorities, can assist in the development and oversight of emergency temporary traffic management planning and arrangements.

## 3.2 Identifying and preparing resources

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Resources for movement control that can be identified and prepared in readiness include:

- equipment (barricades and signage), and
- personnel.

### 3.2.1 Barricades and signage

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Local authorities, contractors, and construction companies have access to barricades and signage.

CDEM Groups and other agencies who may be involved in emergency movement control need to assess how much of this equipment will be available to them in an emergency, and develop a process for accessing, transporting, and returning this equipment.

### Extra resources for larger responses

Access to extra resources for larger responses should also be considered, such as from other private businesses or hire services. This may involve developing pre-arrangements with these businesses.

Note that, during response, equipment already in use (for example, at a scheduled road works site) may need to be gathered and used elsewhere for use in emergency movement control. These decisions will be made by the Controller in consultation with relevant stakeholders.

## 3.2.2 Identifying personnel

---

Emergency movement control must be managed and executed by experienced emergency management personnel, with assistance from traffic managers and other associated personnel.

Personnel can be identified and (if necessary) trained during readiness. Specific roles for emergency movement control may include:

- a dedicated emergency movement control manager (and alternates)
- experienced traffic management personnel such as engineers, coordinators, or Site Traffic Management Supervisors (STMS)
- security and enforcement personnel, such as:
  - Police
  - New Zealand Defence Force
  - local authority enforcement staff, and
  - private security providers.

Considerations in identifying and appointing personnel include:

- other response roles – the person may already have one or several response roles, or may be more valuable in a different role
- related skills and attributes, such as community liaison or dispute resolution experience, and
- cost.

## 3.3 Training and exercising

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Potential CDEM movement control personnel should participate in activities that enhance their skills and experience.

### Exercises

Ensure that personnel involved in movement control are given opportunities to participate in CDEM exercises (particularly response or evacuation-related exercises) run locally, regionally, or nationally.

Temporary Traffic Management for scheduled road works or large events (such as sports events) can also be an effective exercise of local movement control arrangements for emergencies.

### Shadowing and mentoring

Shadowing someone while they carry out BAU movement control roles or tasks provides opportunities to learn from someone with expertise. It also provides an opportunity to carry out peer review.

Mentoring is an effective way to provide guidance to personnel who are new to the role or task. It can be done remotely if there is no-one in the same agency with the required skills.

## Section 4 Response

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During the initial stages of an emergency, response agencies will operate according to their respective mandates and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Movement control measures may be initially implemented by the emergency services or Road Controlling Authorities.

A CDEM Controller may request emergency services or other agencies to implement movement control under their respective mandates, but will direct or authorise movement control under the provisions of the *CDEM Act 2002* **only if a state of emergency is in force**. See [States of emergency](#) below for more detail.

### Response checklist



This section may be read in conjunction with Appendix C [Response checklist](#), which includes a list of response actions (at a high level). This checklist may be customised to:

- include more detail, or
- reflect response procedures used by different agencies.

### 4.1 States of emergency

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As the extent of the emergency becomes apparent, a state of emergency may be declared under the *CDEM Act 2002*.

A state of emergency must have been declared before the Controller can direct or authorise movement control under the provisions of the *CDEM Act 2002*.

#### 4.1.1 If a state of emergency is not in force

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If a state of emergency **is not** in force, a Controller cannot direct or authorise movement control under the provisions of the *CDEM Act 2002*.

However, during non-declared emergencies, a Controller may coordinate the implementation of movement control measures by liaising with:

- local government (authorised to implement movement control under the *Local Government Act 1974*)
- Police (authorised under the *Policing Act 2008*)
- Fire Service (authorised under the *Fire Service Act 1975*)
- Biosecurity New Zealand (authorised under the *Biosecurity Act 1993*), or
- the Environmental Protection Authority (authorised under the *Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996*).

## Dangerous and insanitary buildings

Dangerous and insanitary building closures may be undertaken under the *Building Act 2004*, without the need for a state of emergency to exist.

However, the limitations of this Act (prior to upcoming proposed amendments) mean a state of emergency under the *CDEM Act 2002* may be required to manage any safety risks from damaged buildings (as for the Gisborne earthquake of December 2007, the Darfield earthquake of September 2010, the Christchurch earthquake of February 2011, and the Nelson Tasman floods of December 2012).

### 4.1.2 In a declared state of emergency

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The *CDEM Act 2002* provides a framework for dealing with emergency situations that cannot be dealt with by the emergency services and territorial authorities, or that otherwise require a significant coordinated response. This Act enables a state of emergency to be put in force for a defined time over a defined area, thereby enabling a Controller to manage a response with extraordinary functions and powers to do so.

The following extracts from the *CDEM Act 2002* relate to emergency movement control.

#### **85 Emergency powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups**

- (1) While a state of emergency is in force in its area, a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may—
- (f) prohibit or regulate land, air, and water traffic within the area or district to the extent necessary to conduct civil defence emergency management.

#### **86 Evacuation of premises and places**

If a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or any member of the police, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human life, that person or a person authorised by him or her may require, within the area or district in which the emergency is in force,—

- (a) the evacuation of any premises or place, including any public place; or
- (b) the exclusion of persons or vehicles from any premises or place, including any public place.

## 88 Closing roads and public places

If a state of emergency is in force, a Controller or a member of the police, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or member of the police, or any person so authorised in a relevant civil defence emergency management plan, may, in order to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency, totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place within the area or district in respect of which the state of emergency is in force.



For information specific to declaring, extending and terminating a state of emergency, refer to the *Declarations 2012, Director's Guidelines for CDEM sector [DGL 13/12]*, available at [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).

## 4.2 Gathering information

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As well as intelligence from various response agencies, assessments conducted in response will inform decisions related to movement control. These assessments include:

- rapid impact assessments, and
- rapid building assessments.

These rapid assessments may require movement control measures to be implemented both during and after completion. They may also be followed by more detailed assessments, which could require more complex and/or extensive movement control measures.

### Rapid impact assessments



The MCDEM publication *Rapid Impact Assessment: Information for the CDEM sector [IS 14/13]* is available at [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).

In some circumstances, the necessary resources to conduct rapid impact assessments or specialised damage assessments (such as rapid building assessments) will not be available. In these circumstances, a conservative approach must be adopted and consideration must be given to restricting access via the use of yellow or red placards (as per below) until the appropriate assessment is made.

### Rapid building assessments

The objective of the rapid building assessment process during an emergency is to quickly assess and identify which buildings can be safely occupied.

Rapid building assessments are performed by qualified assessors under the direction of the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE). Building assessors provide an informed view on the risks on the basis of observed damage, given the circumstances of the event such as earthquake (aftershocks), flooding, landslip (further land movement) and other factors. They can also provide advice on movement control; for instance, the distance of a barricade from a dangerous building or buildings.



### The placard system

All assessed buildings will have a placard posted on them to identify their status. Placards identify buildings (and surrounding areas) where movement and access may need to be limited or prevented.

A white placard will be issued for a building that has been assessed and it has been found that there are no known dangers with its continued use.

A yellow placard will be issued for a building where only restricted access to part(s) of the building or short-term access is allowed.

A red placard will be issued for a building where entry is prohibited, because it is at risk from external factors or there is severe damage to the building.

### More information



Detailed resources and information related to post disaster building management is available on the MBIE website [www.building.govt.nz](http://www.building.govt.nz) by searching for 'post disaster building management'.

## 4.3 Analysing the information

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Assessing the need for movement control involves analysing reports from response agencies (including emergency services and lifeline utilities), as well as results from rapid impact or building assessments.

This analysis will involve weighing the advantages and disadvantages of movement control (see section 2.3 on page 10), and deciding whether:

- movement control measures already in place are still needed, and
- additional movement control measures will be needed.

### Developing maps and reports

In the earliest stages of response, a map covering the affected area will be a highly valuable tool for assessing and planning movement control. As the response progresses, integrated information should include historical and up-to-date geospatial information on:

- emergency management infrastructure locations and status, such as emergency operation centres (EOCs), Incident Control Points, Civil Defence Centres (CDCs), police stations, fire stations, and ambulance stations
- lifeline utilities status, as well as supermarkets and petrol stations
- roading and structure conditions, e.g. bridges and retaining walls
- building status, particularly of buildings supporting critical functions such as hospitals, pharmacies, schools, prisons (to the extent available)
- high risk hazard areas
- surveillance information that reflects changes, including persons and vehicles passing through check points (to the extent possible or

available), and

- if available, population distributions and status (based on the latest census data, and informed by response intelligence).

As the response progresses, analysts should compile brief reports and maps that illustrate the area or areas that contain or potentially contain high hazard risk and any evolving movement restrictions.

Areas of high hazard risk may require further emergency movement control to prevent or limit movement of people and vehicles

### **Integrated information management**

Integrated public information management, including pre-event and response/post event information, is key to efficient and effective emergency management, including emergency movement control.

### **Decision making**

A swift, effective, and clearly communicated decision making process is critical for the establishment of movement control and for the many subsequent changes that may be required as an emergency response evolves.

It is likely that certain interests and advice regarding movement control will be in conflict. There is a need for representation of all stakeholders and expertise, and a simple and clear mechanism for swift and authoritative resolution of disputes.

## **4.4 Coordination and liaison**

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Coordination with other agencies in response is essential, particularly with those agencies who may need access to restricted areas to provide emergency or essential services.

### **4.4.1 Transport Operations Centres**

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Where a regional Transport Operations Centre (TOC) exists, it is highly recommended to commence liaison with its representatives early.

TOC staff can contribute valuable network knowledge, as well as provide access to operational contacts, resources, and real-time capability to better handle traffic operations.

In an emergency situation, TOCs will work jointly with Road Controlling Authority staff and emergency services to formulate Traffic Management Plans (for both emergency response and recovery phases), and can convey traveller information to road users using their well-established communication channels.

## 4.4.2 Emergency services

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The emergency services will expect unrestricted access beyond movement control points; this should not be prevented for life safety situations.

Where access is not controlled, each agency should account for all personnel and ensure access is limited to essential staff with requisite skills, experience and equipment. Usually the appreciation and acceptance of risk by emergency services personnel is considerably higher than the normal civilian population. However this does not necessarily mean that they have a better ability to identify or understand specific risks. This may occasionally lead to emergency services personnel getting into dangerous situations without realising it.

Liaison with senior emergency services staff and clear lines of communication with movement control staff should resolve this issue, alongside proactive hazard notification within and around controlled areas.

## 4.4.3 Lifeline utilities

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Lifeline utilities own and operate extensive assets for delivery of services. The nature of these assets varies from case to case, but generally takes the form of nodes (such as exchanges, substations, roadside cabinets and pump stations) connected by above-ground or under-ground links (such as wires, fibre, and pipes).

Utilities need access to these nodes and links for day to day, BAU and restoration purposes.

Their access needs are greatly heightened in emergencies. The main emergency access drivers are:

- service continuity to the wider community, reconfiguration of networks and/or physical protection may be required (e.g. steel plates on street surfaces, generator installation, refuelling and maintenance)
- public safety (e.g. isolation of electricity and gas)
- worker safety (e.g. isolation of or removal of electricity, gas or battery banks), and
- asset value protection by retrieving assets.

The impacts of emergency movement control on lifeline utilities can compound with other response activities such as building works and life-saving activities. It is crucial that Lifeline Utility Coordinators are involved in movement control planning and regular updates are provided to lifeline utilities.

Ideally CDEM Groups and utilities should establish systems or arrangements for access to critical service nodes as a part of readiness activities.

## 4.5 Evacuation

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Movement control that restricts access to and from high risk areas may result in the evacuation of those areas.

Exemptions may apply to emergency response staff acting under the direction of the Controller. These exemptions may include:

- USAR Task Forces
- engineering and construction crews stabilising/demolishing damaged buildings
- critical infrastructure technicians (for maintaining or restoring lifeline utilities)
- hazardous substances clean-up crews
- police and security personnel, and
- building assessors.

### Partial evacuations

Partial evacuations may allow residents to 'shelter in place' inside a cordoned area where damage to their residence is judged to be of relatively low risk.

Movement control restrictions that include residents sheltering in place inside a cordoned area require efficient and effective monitoring of all entry and exit points. An effective public information management programme, to keep all informed of current status, including risks and proposed changes, is required (see section 4.6.1 [Public information](#)).

### The importance of security

Effective security measures are fundamental to the success and acceptance of movement control and the minimisation of negative impacts.

Evacuees and the public at large need to be reassured that steps are being taken to ensure the security of their property. It is important that public information includes statements as to what protective action is being taken (see section 4.6.1 [Public information](#)).

## 4.6 Ongoing considerations

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Major on-going considerations for movement control during response include:

- public information
- hazard identification and notification
- main supply routes, and
- safety and security.

## 4.6.1 Public information

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Movement control has a major impact on peoples' lives. It affects access to homes, businesses, families, shops, banks, schools, and work places. The restrictions can also create a significant disruption to traffic flow through an area.

The public must be kept informed about when, why, and where movement control is to be used; this not only makes it easier to limit and manage congestion at checkpoints, but also helps affected communities to understand, accept, and adapt to the restrictions.

### Role of the Public Information Management (PIM) team

It is important that Public Information Management (PIM) teams are involved in movement control planning so they can be briefed and understand what is happening, and design public information releases accordingly. PIM teams have access to the media, websites, social media, advertising, call centres, and other channels to help keep the public informed.

Due to the numerous agencies that may be involved with emergency movement control, it is particularly important for their respective PIM teams to coordinate with the lead agency PIM team.

### Managing demands for information

The existence of a cordon may be questioned by the media (as well as on social media), legal professionals, and insurance companies. They may demand to know more about the risk, the extent of the response, and the relevant timeframes. This takes time and effort to manage. An accurate, current, and justifiable reason for why the restrictions exist must be constantly maintained, while the reasoning for excluding people from public and private property must be explained in detail as often as possible.

The PIM team manages the release of information to the public and the media; emergency movement control personnel must ensure that they have accurate information to work with, and that the reasoning behind movement restrictions is clear and understandable.

### Protests and challenges

Cordons can become a focal point for protests; some groups may use the cordon as leverage to advance other causes.

Disillusioned constituents affected by the cordon will likely revert to their elected members to challenge local and central government politicians about access and/or the reason for the cordon.

Firm and consistent public information messaging is required to address these issues.

## 4.6.2 Hazard identification and notification inside controlled areas

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Proactive identification of specific hazards within controlled areas may be just as important as movement controls.

While early notification may be limited, for example danger tape or improvised signage, a consistent and recognisable system such as work site hazard boards or building assessment placards will be more effective.

Amongst the many benefits, clear identification and notification can:

- inform risk management for authorised access
- reinforce the need for emergency movement control, and
- assist development and eventual removal of movement control.

## 4.6.3 Main supply routes

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Main Supply Routes (MSRs) are the routes upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of response or recovery operations.

These may have to flow through an area where movement control has been established. Efforts should be made by movement control personnel to identify MSRs that can be maintained outside controlled areas.

MSRs are especially important for the emergency services and will likely draw on resources if they flow through controlled areas. Consideration should be given how best to provide for MSRs inside controlled areas.

## 4.6.4 Health, safety, and security

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Personnel involved in emergency movement control will be exposed to numerous hazards; they must be identifiable and must wear appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

### Authorised access to controlled areas

Access will be required to controlled areas including within cordons. A robust system for managing access will involve:

- defined rules/requirements
- delegated decision making
- an access information management system
- clear identification for authorised persons, and
- clear communication and dispute resolution.

### Breaches of restricted access

Cordons that restrict access to businesses and private property are likely to be breached by unauthorised personnel. Planning for movement control should include measures to deter, detect, and deal with these breaches.

A robust cordon access system minimises both the delay for essential/authorised access and the opportunity for unauthorised access.

**Vulnerable populations**

CBD's may have vulnerable populations such as homeless people. Additional considerations around security, dangerous building access and responder safety need to be developed.

**Clarifying responsibilities and expectations**

Building owners retain their normal responsibilities, including security, safety, and managing tenants, even if they can't physically access the building.

Controllers and the Police are not liable for the specific security of individual buildings; engagement and communication with building owners is particularly important in clarifying expectations.

**Staffing and resourcing**

Careful consideration should be given to how many staff and resources are used for security purposes; more critical activities such as further evacuations, rescues, and traffic control should be prioritised.

Police may be able to provide initial security; however their resources may be needed more urgently elsewhere. Additional long-term security arrangements should be planned for, while remote surveillance may be the most effective approach with limited staff. It is important in security plans to distinguish the initial response from evolving response and recovery.

The safety and surveillance of security personnel needs to be planned for when deploying in or near an evacuated area.

**Crime levels**

Crime levels during natural disasters have been shown to be generally equivalent to the typical amount of crime in non-emergency times<sup>3</sup>; however in an evacuated area, undesirable or unlawful behaviour may present and may not be reported immediately. Normal levels of crime prevention should continue as much as practical in and around cordoned-off areas.

**Breaches of security**

It must be anticipated that people will attempt to access the restricted area without authorisation. Consideration should be given to what the appropriate response will be. In some cases it may be appropriate to do nothing, other than maintaining perimeter security, as action may increase the risk to security personnel.

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<sup>3</sup> Tierney, K., Bevc, C., Kuligowski, E., (2006) Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 604, No. 1, 57-81

## 4.6.5 Other key considerations

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Other key on-going considerations for movement control during response include:

- accessing critical private information
- putrescible waste
- animals, and
- vehicles and property.

### *Accessing critical private information*

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Provision should be made for those businesses and activities that hold crucial private information, such as medical records, financial documents, or legal documents.

This information must be collected as soon as possible under safe conditions by authorised personnel and returned to the legal owner.

Relevant legislation includes:

- *Privacy Act 1993*, and
- *Human Rights Act 1993*.

### *Putrescible waste*

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When applicable, the Controller should direct environmental health officers of territorial authorities to identify and manage waste that is likely to decay.

### *Animals*

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A cordon or other emergency movement control measure may affect the welfare of animals. Sources for advice include:

- CDEM Group or Local Welfare Managers
- Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) representatives
- local authority animal control or animal services
- veterinary professionals
- Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RNZSPCA)
- Federated Farmers or primary industry organisations
- other volunteer organisations working in animal welfare, and
- National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Advisory Group.

Emergency movement control measures may also affect pest and infestation controls; MPI provides advice in this area.



## Vehicles and property

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If movement control remains in place for an extended period, consideration should be given to managed programmes for a number of purposes including:

- vehicle retrieval
- commercial property retrieval
- residential property retrieval, and
- insurance assessment.

### 4.7 Retrieval of costs

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#### Financial support from central government

Costs incurred by local authorities for emergency movement control may be eligible for repayment as part of an emergency response claim.

Local authorities must work with their MCDEM Regional Emergency Management Advisor to clearly understand what costs they are incurring, what is claimable, and what documentation is required at a later date.

Finance is one of the sub-functions of Logistics, and is responsible for organising finances to support a response. This includes assisting in preparing claims to central government for the reimbursement of qualifying response costs.



The MCDEM publication *Logistics in CDEM [DGL 17/15]* provides further guidance, and is available at [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz).

#### Recovery of costs from private property owners

It is important that the costs associated with emergency movement control are recognised as early as possible by the parties responsible for mitigating the risks.

If emergency movement control has resulted from failures of private property (for example, unsafe buildings), then local authorities should develop a plan for cost recovery if movement control measures (such as cordons) are still necessary after an extended period.

#### Relevant legislation

Existing legislation for cost recovery or financial penalties includes:

- *Building Act 2004*
- local bylaws, for example allowances for road encroachment, and
- *Local Government Act 1974* – s357 (provides for penalties for unauthorised damage or encroachment to roads).

## Section 5 Recovery

Ongoing movement control can either assist or impede recovery following an emergency. It is therefore essential during the transition from response to recovery to allow for a review of emergency movement control.

Thorough record keeping during the response phase will greatly assist recovery processes for emergency movement control, particularly cordon reduction.

### 5.1 Transition plans

A review of emergency movement control for transition plans and recovery action plans should include the following elements:

- status of movement control
- basis for individual movement control, including specific hazards
- requirements for removal of movement control, and
- roles and responsibilities.

### 5.2 Cordon reduction

Large cordons will likely necessitate a staged approach to removal. Ongoing hazard assessments and mitigation works should be carried out based on prioritisation to assess cordon reduction.

If works are complex in nature, the effort and time involved in cordon reduction is likely to far outweigh that of activation.

The key considerations for cordon reduction are shown in Table 3 below.

**Table 3 Key considerations for cordon reduction**

Consideration	Detail
Defining the reduced area	Delineating the new cordon perimeter according to ongoing hazard and risk assessments, and the needs of residents, businesses, and other stakeholders. Defining locations of barricades, and vehicle and pedestrian access points. Deciding on a process or method for implementing the reduction. Deciding on a timeframe for the reduction.
Identifying requirements for access and activity	Understanding the required activities of emergency services and lifeline utilities. Developing work programmes (with lifeline utilities or contractors). Understanding the required activities of residents, businesses, and other stakeholders.

Identifying health, safety, and security needs	<p>Gathering information on the status of buildings, utilities, roads, and public spaces (including street lighting).</p> <p>Preparing a list of hazards and risks.</p> <p>Anticipating potential health, safety, and security issues.</p>
Developing rules for access and activity	<p>Developing rules for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• access (specify restrictions, ID systems, and access procedures)</li> <li>• vehicle use (including speed limits and car parking)</li> <li>• health and safety (including emergency procedures), and</li> <li>• building compliance.</li> </ul> <p>See Appendix D <a href="#">Cordon management - example</a> on page 45.</p>
Public information	<p>Allowing stakeholders opportunities to consult on cordon reduction timeframes and rules as they are developed.</p> <p>Working with the PIM team to inform stakeholders of the timeframes, and rules for access and activity, once they have been decided and approved.</p>

### 5.2.1 Reintroduction of people to evacuated areas

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If people are evacuated from an area due to movement control, consideration needs to be given as to how people will be reintroduced to the area, and how hazards will be managed.

### 5.3 Return to business as usual

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Once emergency movement control is no longer required, temporary and more permanent traffic and regular access management procedures for individual sites should be re-instated in accordance with BAU procedures. The desired end-state for emergency movement control should be considered and established if possible during the transition from response to recovery.

# Section 6 Appendices

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- Appendix A About CDEM ..... 32
- Appendix B Cordon management - example ..... 37
- Appendix C Response checklist..... 39
- Appendix D References ..... 42

## Appendix A About CDEM

### CDEM

In this document, **Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)** has the same meaning as in the *CDEM Act 2002*:

#### 4 Interpretation...

##### **civil defence emergency management—**

- (a) means the application of knowledge, measures, and practices that—
  - (i) are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property; and
  - (ii) are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency; and
  - (iii) includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices.



A full description of CDEM (including a full glossary of terms and abbreviations) is provided in the *Guide to the National CDEM Plan*, available at [www.civildefence.govt.nz](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz) by searching the document name.

### Emergency

In this document, **emergency** has the same meaning as in the *CDEM Act 2002*:

#### 4 Interpretation...

##### **emergency** means a situation that—

- (a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and
- (b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and
- (c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant and co-ordinated response under this Act.

Note that this definition of an emergency is different from the one used in the **Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)**. CIMS is not based on the *CDEM Act 2002*, and a modified definition is required for other agencies using CIMS, particularly emergency services.

## MCDEM

**Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM)** is the central government agency responsible for providing leadership, strategic guidance, national coordination, and the facilitation and promotion of various key activities across the 4Rs (reduction, readiness, response, recovery). It is the lead agency at a national level responsible for coordinating the management of the emergencies listed in the *National CDEM Plan*.

MCDEM may act as a support agency by coordinating the CDEM response to any given emergency managed by another lead agency. MCDEM is responsible for maintaining the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), and the National Warning System.

## CDEM Group

In this guideline, **CDEM Group** refers to the collective of local authorities, emergency services, and other agencies that work together to implement CDEM in their area. **CDEM Group** may also refer to the committee of elected officials that are accountable for CDEM in their area.

CDEM Groups are required under the *CDEM Act 2002*; every local authority is required to be a member of a CDEM Group.

There are 16 CDEM Groups in New Zealand. Each is responsible for CDEM in its area, including:

- identifying and managing hazards and risks
- providing the organisational structure and resources necessary (including suitably trained personnel) for the effective delivery of CDEM
- undertaking CDEM readiness activities, including raising public awareness about CDEM and preparing a CDEM Group Plan
- coordinating or undertaking CDEM response and recovery activities, and
- providing support and assistance to other CDEM Groups, if required.

## CDEM response facilities

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### NCMC

The **NCMC (National Crisis Management Centre)** is a secure, all-of-government coordination centre used by agencies to monitor, support, or manage a response at the national level.

It is an example of a National Coordination Centre (NCC).

MCDEM is responsible for maintaining the NCMC in a state of readiness, and will act as the lead agency for CDEM-led responses.

### ECC

An **ECC (Emergency Coordination Centre)** is a coordination centre that operates at the CDEM Group level to coordinate and support one or more activated EOCs.

**EOC** An **EOC (Emergency Operations Centre)** is a coordination centre that operates at a local level to manage a response.

**ICP** An **ICP (Incident Control Point)** is a coordination centre that operates at the incident level to manage a response.

**CDC** A **Civil Defence Centre (CDC)** is a facility that is established and managed by CDEM during an emergency to support individuals, families/whānau, and the community. CDCs are open to members of the public, and may be used for any purpose including public information, evacuation, welfare, or recovery, depending on the needs of the community.


CDCs are operated by CDEM-led teams (including CDEM-trained volunteers), or by other agencies as defined in CDEM Group Plans or local level arrangements.

**Community-led centres** Community members and/or community-based organisations may establish and operate other centres that offer support to the community.

These centres do not fall under the direction of CDEM, although they may coordinate with and operate alongside CDEM-led facilities.

### **Business as usual structure**

The general structure of a CDEM Group is shown in Figure 2 below. Variations to this structure are discussed on the next page.



**Figure 2 CDEM structure for business as usual**



### Joint committee

The **Joint Committee** is part of a CDEM Group's structure. It is made up of elected representatives of member authorities, such as mayors, chairpersons, or their delegates. In CDEM Groups with a unitary authority structure, the Joint Committee is a committee of councils, or a council functioning as a CDEM Group.

### CEG

The **Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)** is part of a CDEM Group's structure. It is made up of chief executives (or their delegates) of the local authorities, representatives of emergency services, and others.

### Variations in CDEM Group structure

CDEM structures vary significantly in the different Groups. The CDEM Group Plan will show their particular structure. The main variations in structures are:

- GEMO with no local EMO(s) (includes unitary authorities)
- all or some of the EMOs reporting through the GEMO, rather than through the territorial authorities
- pooling territorial resources to jointly provide all CDEM functions in the CDEM Group's region
- grouping EMOs under area offices over several local councils, and
- the CDEM Group contracting out provision of CDEM to a third party, who report directly to the CEG.

## CDEM response structure

The structure of a national emergency response is shown Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 CDEM structure during response

A **Controller** is the person in charge of the response (or part of the response) at each coordination centre, and at each level of response coordination.

## Appendix B Cordon management - example

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Cordon management for Christchurch following the earthquake of 22 February 2011 involved:

- identifying the high risk hazards, such as dangerous building drop zones and isolating these hazards
- 31km of fencing
- erecting an outer cordon (the 'Four Avenues')
- deploying NZDF personnel 24/7 for entry/exit check points
- providing an access information system, including temporary ID access cards, for registration, checking in/out, and monitoring of:
  - resident access
  - business owner access
  - contractor access
- development of a business access plan
- development of a residential access plan
- development of a putrescible waste plan
- progressive reduction of the cordoned area by staged openings of cordoned zones including detailed traffic management
- contractor coordination, and
- a public information programme.

### Example of cordon rules

The following example rules for cordon access (on the next page) may be adapted to suit different cordons. The example rules are based on the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority's *CBD red zone cordon rules – Oct 2012*.

# *[insert name of cordon]* RULES

**The following rules apply to every person who enters the *[name of cordon]* cordon**

Authorisation	<p>All works are subject to direction from <i>[insert name of lead agency]</i>.</p> <p>All access must be authorised by <i>[lead agency contact]</i>.</p> <p>Any requests for exemption to these rules must be submitted to <i>[lead agency contact]</i>.</p> <p>No roads can be closed without permission <i>[insert reference to plan or permit procedure]</i>.</p>
Access	<p>Access to this cordon is strictly 18 + years.</p> <p>No animals allowed.</p> <p>Movement into and out of this cordon must be via designated checkpoints.</p>
Breaches	<p>Breaches of any cordon rules may result in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Time, site, or activity restrictions in the cordon.</li><li>• Suspension or cancellation of access authorisation.</li><li>• Further investigation and legal proceedings.</li></ul>
Vehicles	<p>The following speed limits apply: <i>[insert list of specific limits, and where they apply]</i>.</p> <p>The following parking restrictions apply: <i>[insert list of specific limits, and where they apply]</i>.</p> <p>The following vehicle-related restrictions apply: <i>[insert list of any other rules related to vehicle use]</i>.</p> <p>All normal vehicle licencing and registration rules apply.</p>
Health and safety	<p>The following personal protection equipment (PPE) must be worn at all times: <i>[insert list]</i></p> <p>The cordon area is smoke, drug, and alcohol free.</p> <p>In the event of a serious accident, incident, or suspected criminal activity, call 111, then notify <i>[insert lead agency]</i>.</p>
Contractors	<p>All contractors working within the cordon must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Follow all health and safety procedures</li><li>• Report all accidents, incidents, or near misses</li><li>• Attend scheduled contractor meetings</li><li>• In the event of an emergency, leave their access/ID cards at the access point as they leave the area</li></ul>
Emergencies	<p>In the event of an emergency: <i>[insert or refer to emergency procedures particular to the cordon]</i></p>
Enquiries	<p>All access requirements must be directed to <i>[name of lead agency contact]</i></p> <p>All media enquiries must be directed to <i>[name of lead agency contact]</i></p>

## Appendix C Response checklist

This template is:

- for use by personnel from any response agency during an emergency
- prepared during readiness
- intended to be customised to reflect actual processes used by response agencies

Red text may be deleted.

### Activation

		Done (tick)	Assigned to	Started (date/time)	Finished (date/time)
Determine why movement control is necessary, and to what extent it is needed					
Gather information on movement control measures already in place (develop a current, accurate map of relevant locations)					
Assess whether further movement control measures are required					
Ascertain availability of emergency movement control personnel					
Ascertain availability of movement control equipment					
Identify logistical requirements for implementing movement control measures (with Logistics team)					
<i>CDEM personnel only</i>	If a state of emergency is currently in force: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• seek approval from Controller to implement movement control measures</li> </ul>				
	If a state of emergency is not in force: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• seek approval from Controller to request other agencies to implement movement control measures</li> </ul>				
Ensure emergency movement control measures are incorporated into the initial ECC or EOC Action Plan, or <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a stand-alone emergency movement control action plan with input from other coordination centre functions and agencies</li> </ul>					
Deploy emergency movement control personnel or teams according to action plans/agency SOPs					

## Ongoing response work

<b>Ongoing movement control tasks</b> (subject to approval by Controller, and in consultation with relevant CIMS function managers/personnel)	<b>Assigned to (role, team, or agency)</b>
Maintain situational awareness of ongoing response (consider results from building assessments, hazard and environment analysis, and response work in evacuated areas)	
Maintain awareness of ongoing needs of any people or businesses who have been displaced or isolated as a result of movement control (in consultation with the Welfare team)	
Share information with other coordination centre functions, and response agency representatives	
Ensure main supply routes (MSRs) are open and functional	
For coordination centre personnel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Liaise regularly with personnel at movement control sites</li> </ul>	
For personnel at movement control sites: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report regularly to personnel at the coordination centre on the current situation, and current or projected resourcing needs</li> </ul>	
Ensure that maps and reports include current data related to movement control measures	
Continually re-assess the need for movement control measures, considering: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ongoing hazards and risks</li> <li>• distribution of personnel and equipment according to priorities</li> <li>• the advantages and disadvantages of retaining current movement control measures</li> <li>• the advantages and disadvantages of implementing new movement control measures</li> </ul>	
Plan and implement any changes to movement control sites with other functions, support agencies, and stakeholders	
Work with the PIM Manager/Team to keep stakeholders informed (this may involve holding stakeholder meetings).	
Work with the PIM Manager/Team to prepare and issue public messages related to road closures, cordons, or any other movement control measures that are/will be in place.	
Ensure that movement control equipment is tracked, stored, and maintained appropriately	
Ensure movement control personnel are rostered appropriately, and have regular breaks	
Ensure all agencies or private service providers (for example, security contractors) follow SOPs and health and safety procedures	
Ensure that all relevant reporting and record keeping processes are followed	

## Termination

	Done (tick)	Assigned to	Started (date/time)	Finished (date/time)
Coordinate the deactivation of any remaining movement control sites (may involve developing a deactivation plan if there are multiple sites, or large sites)				
Develop ongoing management or access plans for larger or more complex sites (such as an extensive cordoned area)				
Work with the PIM team to consult with or inform stakeholders and the public				
Integrate movement control considerations into wider transition plans, exit strategies, or recovery plans				
Debrief movement control personnel or teams as appropriate				
Ensure movement control equipment is accounted for and returned to its BAU owner or location				

## Appendix D References

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