



Key Points from the 2008 National Lifelines Forum

- Moving from *regional hotspots* as determined by Engineering Lifelines Groups to identify *national hotspots* – locations/ areas that are of national significance
 - The key is in the definitions, and being clear on how the outcomes are to be used
 - The current NELC project is just to develop the *methodology*, not to undertake a systematic identification of the national hotspots.
- Focusing on making Lifelines Engineering activities relevant for all participants
 - Effective involvement of national utilities in Lifelines Groups is crucial
 - Greater convergence in approach by Lifeline Groups is needed in order to ensure better engagement with national Lifeline Utilities
 - 11 tips for achieving more effective Lifeline Group activity programmes were offered by the National Engineering Lifelines Co-ordinator
 - National leadership is needed from the Infrastructure Resilience programme
- Key Learnings from the December 2007 Gisborne earthquake
 - While there was only limited direct physical damage to utilities in this event, prior mitigation by some agencies further reduced the actual damage
 - The key learnings/ examples from Transpower, NZTA and Gisborne District Council are to be drawn together into a brief summary report
- Tsunami Hazard Update and Simulation Exercise
 - New research by GNS Science indicates that tsunami does not add significantly to the estimated losses resulting from major earthquakes on the Wellington and Wairarapa faults.
 - A very large subduction zone earthquake is the worst local tsunami source for Wellington
 - Work on defining tsunami evacuation zones is being progressed by GNS, MCDEM and regional councils
 - Lifeline Utilities haven't really wrapped their mind around this threat
 - Sector Co-ordinating Entities for co-ordinating the information flow and actions within key utility sectors – the devil is in the detail; utilities need to buy into the development of SCEs
 - The cleanup operation has considerable time implications for utility sites due to the nature of the debris and likely damage to external fittings and fixtures
- Transpower: Managing Seismic Risk
 - Making Lifelines work part of Business As Usual, with active follow-up on a three-yearly cycle
 - The considerable value of restraining plant and office items (and spares) as a low-cost mitigation activity is evident, particularly in the context of the Gisborne earthquake

- Geospatial Developments at the National Level
 - Lifelines work fits within the National Geospatial Strategy
 - Maximising interoperability through the use of standards is a key element of the strategy; need to use open platforms when sharing info
 - Distributed Spatial Data Infrastructure
 - Objective: 'Maintain at source/access from source/permissioning at source'

- Climate Change
 - Parameters for use in design are becoming better articulated (along with the uncertainty range)
 - MfE is actively seeking case studies of adaptation initiatives by Lifeline Utilities

- Fuel Supply Vulnerability and Contingency Planning
 - Following on from work by the Auckland, Canterbury and West Coast Lifelines Groups, MCDEM is now facilitating the development of a National Fuel Contingency Plan
 - Observations from Rob Daniel (West Coast): "if services are less reliable, end users are more self-reliant" and "If you replace *fuel* with *food* in this discussion, the issues and community implications are the same"

- Reviewing Original Lifelines Project Reports
 - Session discussed where the value from the original projects really came from
 - The process rather than project report itself was seen as the enduring benefit
 - The fundamentals of how to work together (mitigation and preparedness) continues to be an area of need and is the suggested focus going forward
 - Noted that the updating of hazard information generally for a region is the role of regional councils, not the primary responsibility of Lifelines Groups

- Telco Prioritisation and Congestion Control in Emergencies
 - Call prioritisation isn't currently an option from a technical perspective
 - There are some tools to manage congestion situations, but these are not well suited to a dynamic shock of sudden and significant added loading from a major emergency

- Focusing on Understanding Systems and their Risks
 - Linking separate systems together into wider networks can address smaller risks effectively, but increases the consequence of some system failure types (ie. cascade failure)
 - This highlights the importance of redundancy
 - A suggested definition of Community Resilience is 'The ability at every relevant level to anticipate and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges'

- Online availability of Lifeline Utility status information during an emergency event
 - This is a topic of interest to most utilities and CDEM groups, and the Hawke's Bay and Manawatu-Wanganui Lifelines Groups have recently proposed system solutions. Funding support is required for further development.
 - Any system needs to be applicable across regions (ie. ideally a nationally consistent platform) for it to be of benefit to national utilities
 - A meeting between reps from these groups plus relevant national agencies is to be held before the end of the year to establish which system is to be proceeded with